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Conceptual Problems of International and World Order Formation

The problem of a new international order formation is associated with a number of interrelated issues: changing the role of a state in the international arena, strengthening non-state actors in international relations, the impact of globalization on the political, economic and cultural spheres, interdependence and more. The aim of the article is to form a holistic view of the formation of the new international order in the context of global international political transformations, as well as to determine the fundamental difference between the international and world order. The use of a systematic approach makes it possible to study the international order as a set of relations between the main actors of international relations. It is established that the scientific category “international order” should be distinguished from “world order”. Given the existence of an institutional framework between states, an international order can exist without a world order. “International order” can move to a qualitatively new state of a “world order” when the process of ordering will involve all international actors without exception

Keywords: International order, public order, system of international affairs, USA, UN, international law, transformation.

Концептуальні проблеми формування міжнародного і світового порядку

Проблема формування нового міжнародного порядку пов'язана з низкою взаємопов'язаних питань: зміна ролі держави на міжнародній арені, посилення недержавних учасників міжнародних відносин, вплив глобалізаційних процесів на політичну, економічну та культурні сфери, взаємозалежність тощо. Метою статті є формування цілісного уявлення про формування нового міжнародного порядку в контексті глобальних міжнародних політичних трансформацій, а також визначення різниці між міжнародним та світовим порядком. Теоретико-методологічну основу дослідження становлять наукові методи та методологічні підходи до осмислення процесу трансформації міжнародного порядку. В основу дослідження покладені методологічні принципи системного підходу, що дає можливість вивчати міжнародний порядок як комплекс відносин між основними суб'єктами: державами, міжнародними організаціями та транснаціональними акторами.

Встановлено, що наукова категорія «міжнародний порядок» необхідно відрізнити від «світового порядку». Враховуючи інституціональні основи між державами «міжнародний порядок» цілком може існувати без наявності світового порядку. Під «міжнародним порядком» розуміємо структуру взаємозв'язків, що ґрунтується на системі норм і правил, вироблених світовим співтовариством, і регулює міждержавні відносини у взаємодії з іншими учасниками міжнародної системи. Натомість «світовий порядок» – устрій, заснований на відмові держав від абсолютного суверенітету, дотриманні норм міжнародного права, забезпеченні прав людини, спільному виробленні механізмів колективного вирішення глобальних проблем людства і демократизації міжнародної системи. «Міжнародний порядок» може перейти в якісно новий стан «світового» коли до процесу порядкуутворення залучатимуться всі без винятку міжнародні актори, а взаємини між ними регулюватимуться єдиними для всіх нормами та правилами на основі критеріїв, що відповідатимуть потребам усіх учасників міжнародних відносин. Державоцентрична вертикальна модель управління міжнародним порядком із часом поступається місцем інституційній, в якій провідну роль відіграють міжнародні організації.

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Ключові слова: міжнародний порядок, світовий порядок, система міжнародних відносин, США, ООН, міжнародне право, трансформація.

The problem formulation Contemporary global processes are evidence that the international system is in a state of transition. In the context of global international political transformations, the terms “new international order” and “new world order”, despite all the differences in their interpretation, have already entered the scientific community of researchers and politicians. However, in the context of this study, it is very important to understand the differences between them. We consider it necessary to study the essence of the problem and identify differences in concepts.

Previous researches analysis. Most research papers now point out that the contemporary international or world order began to take shape with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These events have an undeniable impact on the conditions for the functioning and development of the world order and led to the fact that the balance of powers was upset and the world became unipolar. The question of which system has become dominant in international relations, the rules and which centers of power to shape the world order causes many discussions among scientists.

In scientific terms, the problem of world order formation is associated with a number of related issues. For example, the changing role of a state in the international arena, the strengthening of non-state actors in international relations, the impact of globalization on the political, economic and cultural spheres, interdependence, and so on. In addition to R. Keohain and J. Nye, this problem was the focus of attention of K. Waltz, S. Huntington, R. Cox, I. Wallerstein, J. Rosenau, S. Krasner, Zb. Brzezinski and many other scientists. For example, R. Keohain and J. Nye, as representatives of the liberal-idealist paradigm, entered into scientific discourse with realists and neo-Marxists on most of the above issues.

Thus, today there are a lot of theories and hypotheses on the formation and development of the world order in the XXI century. The most famous among them are the theories of neorealism, neoliberalism, neo-Marxism, transnationalism, institutionalism, constructivism, postmodernism, neoconservatism, and so on. They emphasize that the system of international relations, based on the principles of balance of power and confrontation between the two superpowers, has been replaced by a different reality. Therefore, the analysis of the emergence of new international political relations on the world stage is important, as well as the identification of patterns of their further development, which can become the basis for global political decisions. At the same time, the role and importance of geopolitical confrontation, a force that shapes and changes the contemporary world order and acts as an integral objective part of social relations and interactions, is growing.

Purposes and objectives of the research. The purpose of the article is to form a holistic view of the formation of the new international order in the context of global international political transformations and, on this basis, to determine the fundamental difference between the international and world order.

Main material presentation. It should be emphasized that today almost all mechanisms to support international security, created after the Second World War and during the Cold War (UN, NATO, OSCE, PACE, etc.), were not quite ready for the challenges and threats of the XXI century. The problems of preventing nuclear war and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, overcoming inequalities in the socio-political development of “rich” and “poor” countries, combating international terrorism, resolving the energy and food crisis, improving the environmental component in the sustainable development of mankind, optimization of the demographic situation in the world, conservation and careful use of natural, primarily non-reproducible, resources.

Considering the above, let us consider in more detail the etymology of the terms international and world order in the conceptual interpretation of the researchers of this phenomenon.

The generally accepted thesis of the scientific community is that the identification of the international order and the system of international relations is theoretically and practically unjustified, as both concepts lose their own qualitative certainty, which leads to terminological ambiguity of political science.

A number of researchers consider the international order as a structure of international relations. This is especially true for representatives of realistic and neorealistic schools of international relations theory. According to them, it is the structure that regulates the relationship between the participants in

international relations and forms patterns of behavior. The main thing in the structure of the international system is the ratio of powers of the leading states, the hierarchy of relations between them.

In turn, institutionalists, led by S. Krasner², R. Keohane³ and O. Young⁴ understand the international order as a set of certain institutions that form a certain system of international relations, designed to meet the basic needs of states and peoples, create and maintain conditions for their existence, security and development. The main institutions of the international order usually include the UN, the World Bank, NATO, other international organizations, as well as informal forms of cooperation, codes of corporate conduct and international regimes.

It should be noted that today in the system of international relations there is a new state of polycentrism for contemporary history – a plurality of centers of power, none of which has a decisive influence on the world situation as a whole. In such circumstances, the problems of the world order become especially significant – such a state of affairs, which would suit all participants in international relations of this order, in the absence of direct dominance of one of them.

From the point of view of the American author T. Frank, the basis of the international order is legality – a set of rules created in the course of generally accepted legal procedures, characterized by clarity, interconnectedness and fit into the existing system of international law⁵.

However, from the standpoint of the existence of international society, such a view seems to be too narrow, since it is not just to reduce the problem of international order in interstate relations, but also to consider interstate relations themselves in only one dimension. The essence of international relations is understood by representatives of different theoretical schools and political directions in different ways, so the difficulties in understanding the problem of the international order are doubled.

Indeed, if we consider that the basis of international relations is a selfish game of states, each of which protects its national interest, then we are dealing with a realistic and interstate order. If we assume that international relations are governed by norms, procedures, institutions or structures of a transnational or even supranational nature, then we can talk about the legal international order. If we consider that states, as the central actor in international relations, are increasingly being pushed out of the arena of history by other actors operating independently of national and state borders, then we are talking about a transnational order. The term “international order”, the meaning of which is traditionally associated with interstate relations, must be distinguished from the world order⁶.

If we consider the world order as a system that arose as a result of the refusal of each participant in international relations, it should be noted, that the world history has not yet known such a system. However, this does not mean that world order is impossible in principle. On the contrary, with the expansion of the circle of participants in international relations, as well as with the strengthening of the interdependence of the world, stimulated by scientific and technological progress, and the aggravation of global problems, This very trend reflects the general sociological processes and patterns that are due to the activities of social communities on the world stage. Therefore, in recent years, the term “global world order” has become increasingly common.

Thus, the international order is an important part of the world order, but the whole content of the world order is not reduced to it. Therefore, from the point of view of the academic approach, the world and international orders should not be identified, but it is also wrong to absolutize their difference. They have common roots, common foundations that ensure the unity of human society as well as its integrity.

Given this methodological requirement, S. Hoffman makes the starting point of his analysis of the problem of international order its main dimensions – characteristics that reflect the empirical data, which summarizes the study of methods of creating and maintaining international order. The most studied dimension of the international order is the horizontal, ie the relationship between the main ac-

² Krasner S (1983) Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. *International Regimes* / Ed. by S. Krasner. Ithaca : Cornell Univ. Press. 372 p.

³ Keohane R.O. (1984) *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 320 p.

⁴ Young O. (1989) The Politics of International Regime Formation: Matural Resources and the Environment. *International Organizations*. 1989. Summer. Vol. 43. № 3. P. 349- 376.

⁵ Franck T.(1990) *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations*. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 320 p.

⁶ Hoffmann S. (1985) L'ordre international, in Grawitz, M Leca J. (eds). *Traite de science politique*. Vol. 1. P.U.F., Paris.

tors in international relations. If the international system is structurally multipolar, then maintaining order in it is carried out through a mechanism of political balance⁷.

First of all, the new world order is designed to provide solutions to global problems. The guarantee of its efficiency and reliability is mutual consideration of interests. The world order of the XXI century should be based on the mechanisms of collective solution of key problems, on the priority of law and broad democratization of international relations. It emphasizes the strengthening of the role of international institutions and mechanisms in the world economy and politics, including the Group of Seven and the United Nations, which needs immediate reforms. The above actualizes the formation of a new political thinking and the corresponding world order, which would be multilateral in nature. A special place in this process was taken by the session of the General Assembly in 2000 – the Millennium Session. The resolutions adopted by it clearly define the main parameters of the world order of the century of globalization. This primarily applies to the UN Millennium Declaration. The Resolution on the implementation of the Declaration considers its provisions in the context of the imposition of moral and political commitments to be implemented at the national, regional and international levels. It is emphasized that governments are responsible, individually and collectively, for the implementation of the Declaration⁸.

The world order is initially based on the goals and principles of the UN Charter, but this charter is not fulfilled as evidenced by numerous violations of international law, human rights, the dominance of force in international relations. In this context, it is necessary to mention the special resolution of the General Assembly “Promoting a democratic and just international order”. In particular, it emphasizes that “everyone has the right to a democratic and just international order”. Solving the relevant problems of creating a common future, based on the unity of mankind in all its diversity, requires extensive and persistent efforts. “These efforts must include policies and tools at the global level that meet the needs of developing countries and are identified and implemented with their effective participation”. This is seen as one of the manifestations of a just and democratic nature of the world order⁹.

In the context of the issues under consideration, the concept of the American scientist Lynn Miller, with which almost all researchers of the international order and system of international relations agree, also deserves attention. The scientist considered the main feature of the international order to be the presence in the international system of a single fundamental principle, which consciously or spontaneously guided states. L. Miller believed that from the middle of the XVII century before the First World War there was only one order, which the author calls Westphalian one. However, many scholars believe that today continues to exist Westphalian international order, which has suborders.

In general, in this context, it is worth mentioning that since 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia led to the end of the Thirty Years' War in Western Europe and authorized the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire into 355 independent states. It is from this time that the nation-state or “nation-state” is universally affirmed as the main form of political organization of society, and the principle of national or state sovereignty becomes the dominant principle of international relations. By 1648, there was a separation and unsystematic interaction between the participants in the world process, the main manifestation of which were short-term armed conflicts or long wars. In general, the Treaties of Westphalia aimed to consolidate the balance of power that emerged as a result of the war, established the borders of nation-states and counteracted the desire of these states to establish their dominance over each other's territories.

Of interest is the fact that L. Miller, considered the basis for such a generalization of the fact that the basis of international relations from 1648 to the First World War of 1914-1918 was the principle of “permissiveness” or “non-interference”. As L. Miller notes, “in the broadest sense, the concept of permissibility presupposes that it is best for the common good to give the greatest degree of freedom and opportunity to individuals in society to serve their own interests”. This principle provided for the refusal of one state to attempt to prevent another state from carrying out its tasks in all cases where it did not directly concern the vital interests of the former. L. Miller considered the “Wilsonian” principle of international regulation, first introduced by W. Wilson in 1918, to be the antithesis of this poli-

⁷ Hoffmann S. (1985) Op. cit. P. 675-680.

⁸ UN Resolution 55/162, 2000 (2000). *UN website*. Documents of the 55th session of the UN. URL: http://www.un.org/ru/ga/third/55/third_res.shtml.

⁹ Ibid.

cy. This principle was embodied in the “interventionist” policy of the League of Nations, then in the activities of the UN, and from the second half of the 1990-s. to the present it has been realized in the politics of the United States of America and the situational coalitions that they created. Unlike realists, L. Miller understood a term “order” not as a “structure” and a “state”, but as a “mode of action” and a “process”¹⁰.

The British researcher Robert Cooper had the same position in interpreting the term “order”. Based on the classic work of Hadley Bull “Anarchic Society. The study of order in world politics”¹¹, he proposed several possible interpretations of the term. First, it can be considered the predominant type of foreign policy behavior of states, regardless of whether it serves to streamline or disorganizes the system, secondly, order can mean a certain degree of stability and integrity of the system, and thirdly, it can be understood as “rules, which manage the system and maintain it in a state of stability; moral meaning, which is embodied in the ideas of justice and freedom”¹².

In this context, it should be noted that the ideological inspiration of L. Miller and R. Cooper was the scientific work of R. Gilpin. In his works in the early 1980's, the idea was formulated that the systemic order in international relations is determined primarily by the presence of a set of rules of conduct. In fact, the very change of these rules can characterize the change of one order to another¹³.

Despite the contribution of the liberal school of international relations to the understanding of the international and world order, in general, we state that the end of the bipolar confrontation did not lead to its clear theoretical predominance. In the end, Fukuyama's thesis about the “unconditional victory” of political liberalism on a global scale did not materialize. Therefore, researchers of various scientific fields were consolidated in order to develop a holistic understanding of the essence of the international order, the laws of its self-organization and optimal opportunities for regulation.

One of the first successful attempts to create a synthetic vision of the international order was a scientific achievement at the beginning of the XXI century. American scientist J. Aikenbury considers the key feature of the international order to be the generally accepted rules and principles by which the participants of the international system are guided in their relations with each other. He even introduces the concepts of “constitutionality” and “unconstitutionality” of certain international orders, emphasizing that the order based only on the balance of power is unconstitutional one¹⁴. Having noted that the phenomenon of constitutionality arose in the field of internal social relations of states, he emphasizes the intensification of its expansion in the field of international relations at the beginning of the XXI century. At the same time, the principle of constitutionality, according to J. Aikenbury, is embodied in the activities of international organizations and other institutions of interstate interaction based on charters or agreements, which tasks include ensuring a fairer and more equitable representation of the interests of less powerful countries in making the most important international decisions, which are most often made by powerful countries “selfishly” and counting only on their own national interests.

One cannot but agree with J. Aikenbury that the role of the institutions of constitutional regulation is important in the stages of the decline of the hegemonic state or in the stages of its early rise, when the institutions can maximally influence the international situation. On the contrary, in a situation where the hegemon is at the zenith of power, it can ignore the reaction of “constitutional” institutions with impunity. At the same time, institutions, if they feel their weakness, can give way to the hegemon or hegemons of a leading role in the formation of order – on the basis of either hegemony or balance. According to J. Aikenbury, “political order is the basic agreement between a group of states on their guidelines, principles and institutions”¹⁵.

The fundamental values that are important for the development of international relations must be laid down in the basis of the world order of the XXI century. These include, first of all: freedom: ensuring human rights, the best guarantee of which is a democratic form of government based on broad

¹⁰ Miller L. (1994) *Global Order : Value and Power in International Politics*. Boulder Co. : Westview Press. P. 50.

¹¹ Bull H. (1977) *Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. – London : Macmillan. 335 p.

¹² Cooper R. (1993) *Is there a New World Order? Prospects for Global Order* / Ed. by Seizaburo Sato and Trevor Taylor. Vol. 2. London. P. 8.

¹³ Gilpin R. G. (1994) *War and Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 272 p.

¹⁴ Ikenberry J. (2001) *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restrain, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton, N.J. 293. P. 8.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 45.

participation and the will of the people; equality: no person and no country should be deprived of the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of development; solidarity: global problems must be addressed in a fair distribution of costs and burdens in accordance with the fundamental principles of equality and social justice; tolerance: people must respect each other in all their diversity of religions, cultures and languages. Of particular note is the provision that “a culture of peace and dialogue between all civilizations must be actively maintained”; respect for nature: joint efforts to ensure the preservation of nature; shared responsibility: the responsibility for managing the world economy and social development, as well as for ensuring peace and security, must be shared by all States and exercised on a multi-lateral basis¹⁶.

David Rockefeller¹⁷ and his older brother Nelson Rockefeller¹⁸ are active ideological disseminators of the concept of a new international order and transnational elites. They are convinced that the supra-national sovereignty of the intellectual elite and international bankers is undoubtedly superior to national self-determination. In general, the Rockefellers advocate internationalism, which is in line with the Wilsonian tradition of American foreign policy, which focuses on building a more integrated global political and economic structure, a single world which existence is inconceivable without effective soft power.

The popularity of other concepts, such as the “concept of regime change” and the idea of an “American democratic empire”, should also be noted. The events of 2003-2008 brought additional disharmony to the vision of regulatory issues. A new cycle of discussions has begun over the crisis of neoliberalism and the partial “deinstitutionalization” of international relations. In general, we note that the study of international relations and the formation of a new international order has shifted to the analysis of the ideas of the “American Empire”, on the one hand, and the revival of multipolarity, on the other, accompanied by growing interest in known developments in international stability through either hegemony or mechanisms of international interaction. Under these conditions, a thorough analysis of existing materials on regulation and leadership seems relevant in terms of identifying the latest trends in international relations¹⁹.

American scientist R. Haas, who acknowledged that the period of stable unipolarity is over and the world has entered an era of non-polar order, characterized by the diffusion of power and influence, increasing the number of active players, including non-state²⁰. Within the framework of such an interpretation of the contemporary world order, one pole of global decision-making is absent, but there are no several competing centers, as in multipolarity. The relative decline of US structural power and the weakness of other contenders for the role of global leader do not allow supporters of this concept to attribute polar characteristics to contemporary international relations.

However, not all researchers agree that the contemporary international order is non-polar. Proponents of the concept of polycentrism of the world believe that international relations tend to pluralism, accompanied by the emergence and further strengthening of the positions of new actors on the world stage²¹. This process directly affects the formation of new centers of world politics. The role of the United States is weakening due to internal contradictions in the United States, due to the inability to bear the burden of responsibility for the fate of the world and dissatisfaction with American hegemony in other countries.

A well-known American scientist, H. Kissinger in his new book “World order” notes, that there has never been a true “world order”. For most of history, civilizations defined their own concepts of order. Each considered itself the center of the world and envisioned its distinct principles as universally relevant. China conceived of a global cultural hierarchy with the emperor at its pinnacle. In Europe, Rome imagined itself surrounded by barbarians; when Rome fragmented, European peoples refined a concept of an equilibrium of sovereign states and sought to export it across the world. Islam, in its early

¹⁶ Annan K. (2000) We the Peoples – The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. *U.N. official website*. URL: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000403.ga9704.doc.html>.

¹⁷ Rockefeller D. (2002) *Memoirs/D.Rockefeller* – N.Y. : Random House. 432 p.

¹⁸ Rockefeller N. (1962) *Federalism and Free World Order. Godkin Lectures at Harvard University on The Future of Federalism*.

¹⁹ Huntington S. (1999) The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs*. 1999. March-April. P. 38-40.

²⁰ Haass R. (2008) The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance. *Foreign Affairs*. May-June. URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessav87304>.

²¹ Ibid.

centuries, considered itself the world's sole legitimate political unit, destined to expand indefinitely until the world was brought into harmony by religious principles. The United States was born of a conviction about the universal applicability of democracy—a conviction that has guided its policies ever since²².

It is difficult not to agree with H. Kissinger that now international affairs take place on a global basis, and these historical concepts of world order are meeting. Every region participates in questions of high policy in every other, often instantaneously. Yet there is no consensus among the major actors about the rules and limits guiding this process or its ultimate destination. The result is mounting tension²³.

In its turn another American scientist S. Fields notes that the reemergence of strong states, discord in the UN Security Council, destabilizing transnational nonstate actors, closing space for civil society within states, and the weakening of the international liberal order all present new obstacles to diplomacy. In *Diplomacy and the Future of World Order*, an international group of experts confronts these challenges to peace and conflict diplomacy – defined as the effort to manage others' conflicts, cope with great power competition, and deal with threats to the state system itself. In doing so, they consider three potential scenarios for world order where key states decide to go it alone, return to a liberal order, or collaborate on a case-by-case basis to address common threats and problems²⁴.

In this respect S. Fields highlights three scenarios for future approaches to peace and conflict diplomacy, explored through the lens of regional perspectives and security threats. These three scenarios are then evaluated through the prism of regional perspectives from around the world and for their potential ramifications for major security threats including peacekeeping, nuclear nonproliferation, cyber competition, and terrorism. Editors Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall conclude the volume by identifying emerging types of diplomacy that may form the foundation for global peacemaking and conflict management in an uncertain future²⁵.

Nowadays the formation of world order takes place under the influence of the unprecedented developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), many dramatic changes will be happening much sooner than everyone has expected. As the US-Sino AI competition is beginning to heat up, the author K. Lee urges that both the United States and China should accept and embrace the great responsibilities that would come with their significant technological power. Most of the world's experts say that AI will already have a devastating impact on blue-collar jobs. However, what Kai-fu Lee predicts is that the Chinese and American AI will eventually have a strong impact on white-collar jobs as well. In his book, he provides a definite and clear description of what jobs will be affected and which jobs can further be enhanced with AI. Most importantly, Lee shows how we can provide the necessary solutions to meet some of the upcoming profound changes in human history²⁶.

The world order is constantly changing and a stable world order is a rare thing. When one does arise, it tends to come after a great convulsion that creates both the conditions and the desire for something new. It requires a stable distribution of power and broad acceptance of the rules that govern the conduct of international relations. Eventually, inevitably, even the best-managed order comes to an end. The balance of power underpinning it becomes imbalanced. The institutions supporting it fail to adapt to new conditions. Some countries fall, and others rise, the result of changing capacities, faltering wills, and growing ambitions. Those responsible for upholding the order make mistakes²⁷.

Major crises have major consequences, usually unforeseen. The Great Depression spurred isolationism, nationalism, fascism, and World War II – but also led to the New Deal, the rise of the United States as a global superpower, and eventually decolonization. The 9/11 attacks produced two failed American interventions, the rise of Iran, and new forms of Islamic radicalism. The 2008 financial crisis generated a surge in antiestablishment populism that replaced leaders across the globe. Future historians will trace comparably large effects to the current coronavirus pandemic; the challenge is figuring them out ahead of time. It is already clear why some countries have done better than others in deal-

²² Kissinger H. (2015) *World Order*. Penguin Books; Reprint edition.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Chester A. Crocker (2021) *Diplomacy and the Future of World Order*. Georgetown University Press.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Fields S. (2021) *Summary of AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and The New World Order*. Fields S. Independently published

²⁷ Haass R. (2019) *How a World Order Ends And What Comes in Its Wake*. *Foreign Affairs*. January/February.

ing with the crisis so far, and there is every reason to think those trends will continue. It is not a matter of regime type. Some democracies have performed well, but others have not, and the same is true for autocracies²⁸.

When future historians think of the moment that marked the end of the liberal world order, they may point to the spring of 2020 – the moment when the United States and its allies, facing the gravest public health threat and economic catastrophe of the postwar era, could not even agree on a simple communiqué of common cause. But the chaos of the coronavirus pandemic engulfing the world these days is only exposing and accelerating what was already happening for years. On public health, trade, human rights, and the environment, governments seem to have lost faith in the value of working together. Not since the 1930s has the world been this bereft of even the most rudimentary forms of cooperation. The liberal world order is collapsing because its leading patrons, starting with the United States, have given up on it²⁹.

The most immediate task facing the the world is the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. Despite many commentaries to the contrary, it is difficult to predict what the longterm impact of the COVID-19 crisis will be on the quest for world order. Along with U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, COVID19 is one of the greatest tests of the U.S.-led international order since its founding over seven decades ago. The next US administration's most important task will be to craft and shepherd a cooperative international response on the production of a vaccine and treatments, coordinate the rebuilding of national economies so they reinforce a mutually beneficial global economy, assist developing countries disproportionately weakened by the virus, and reform global institutions and infrastructure so they are better positioned to deal with the next pandemic and international challenges as a whole³⁰.

Conclusions and prospects for further research. To date, the preconditions for the creation of new mechanisms for regulating international relations have been partially established. First, most countries around the world have consciously sought to expand their participation in the formation of a new world order. Secondly, the limitations imposed by the system of international relations on the actions of each of them separately became obvious to all participants of international communication. In contrast to similar processes of the late XX century the current type of regulation of international relations is based not only on the leadership of one state (USA), but also on the institutional basis of the world order, which is acted upon by international organizations (UN, G-7, NATO).

In this context, it is necessary to note two points that potentially determine the state of contemporary international relations. First, as the UN is experiencing a “crisis of legitimacy” today and the effectiveness of its work leaves much to be desired, the potential scheme of gradually transforming the institutional framework of world governance toward increasing the role of the Group of Seven in the political and military sense. Second, the strengthening of a number of international organizations is accompanied by a relative decline in the role of the United States in the world and an increase in the activity of a number of other actors in international relations.

Thus, the growing role of theoretical and methodological foundations of analysis of international actors in modern conditions, the complexity of various processes and phenomena that transform the world order, determine the need for a holistic system of scientifically designed and sound knowledge, principles and research methods that most adequately reflect the processes of formation and the development of the contemporary world order. In contemporary international relations, “soft power” is not only propaganda, it is rather a unique historical phenomenon, which emphasizes the fact that the state-centric vertical model of world order gradually recedes into the background, transferring authority to various network structures, possessing the means of persuasion on a planetary scale. However, it is stated that in the scientific world, so far, there is no common understanding of the further formation of the international and world order. Competing concepts do not give an unambiguous answer about the research problem.

On the whole, we have to admit that in general, in the literature devoted to the analysis of international relations, there is no unambiguous, generally accepted definition of the international and world

²⁸ Haass R. (2019) Op. cit.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Blackwill R., Wright T. (2020) The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy. *Council Special Report No. 86*. May 2020. p. 11.

order. It has been proven that the basis of the world order is the international order. International order can move into a qualitatively new state of world order only when absolutely all the participants of the international system are involved in the process of order formation, and relations between them will be regulated with the help of uniform norms, rules and mechanisms for supporting this order and on the basis of criteria corresponding to the needs of all members of the world community of this historical era. First of all, the new world order is designed to provide a solution to global problems. The guarantee of its efficiency and reliability is the mutual consideration of interests. World order of the XXI century should be based on the mechanisms of collective solution of key problems, on the priority of law and broad democratization of international relations.

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