

Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу:
Збірник наукових статей. – Чернівці:
Чернівецький національний університет,
2023. – Т. 48. – С. 29-39
DOI: 10.31861/mhpi2023.48.29-39

Modern Historical and Political Issues:
Journal in Historical & Political Sciences. – Chernivtsi:
Chernivtsi National University,
2023. – Volume. 48. – pp. 29-39
DOI: 10.31861/mhpi2023.48.29-39

УДК 338.48.021-44(1-87):355.4(470-651.1:477-651.2)

© Anatoliy Parfinenko¹

The Impact of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on the Transformation of the Liberal Discourse Regarding Freedom of Tourist Travel

The war unleashed by the Kremlin regime against Ukraine has forced liberal internationalism to impose restrictions on the rights and freedoms of Russian travellers. The debate that has arisen in this regard among politicians and think tanks is the focus of this publication. The purpose of the study is to identify the transformations in the liberal policy of freedom of tourist mobility that took place during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The methodological basis of the study is the theory of neoliberalism, public diplomacy and “soft power”. The methods of political analysis of phenomena and processes have been used. The hypothesis of the study is that the basic condition for political decision-making on visa restrictions for Russian citizens should be awareness of the ideological conflict between the mutually exclusive opposites of tourism as a positive force for peace and development and terror, the apology of which is embraced by a large part of Russian society. Accordingly, it has been concluded that the flows of Russian citizens travelling to Europe for tourism purposes pose not only a security threat as potential conductors of the ideas of the “Russian world”, but also extend moral responsibility to the host countries.

Keywords: world politics, liberal order, international tourism, freedom of tourist travel, Russian-Ukrainian war.

Вплив російського вторгнення в Україну на трансформацію ліберального дискурсу свободи туристичних подорожей

Розв’язана кремлівським режимом війна проти України поставила ліберальний інтернаціоналізм в контекст суперечливих сил, пов’язаних з необхідністю обмеження прав та свобод російських туристів щодо вільного подорожування демократичними країнами. Дискусія, яка виникла з цього приводу серед політиків та провідних аналітичних центрів постає в центрі уваги пропонованої публікації. Метою дослідження є визначення трансформацій у ліберальній політиці свободи туристичної мобільності, які відбулися під час російського вторгнення в Україну. Завданнями дослідження є: визначення ролі туризму у просуванні цінностей ліберального світового порядку; характеристика глобального геополітичного контексту, що зумовив кризу ліберального інтернаціоналізму та скорочення туристичної мобільності; аналіз дискусії, яка виникла у світовому політикумі, щодо ідеї запровадження обмеження режиму міжнародної мобільності для громадян Росії; визначення міжнародно-політичного потенціалу туристичних подорожей як важливого концепту доктрини стримування. Теоретико-методичною основою дослідження стали теорії неолібералізму, ліберального інтернаціоналізму, публічної дипломатії та «м’якої сили». Використано методи політичного аналізу явищ та процесів, системний підхід, контент-аналіз, історико-порівняльний, статистичний та ін. методи. Гіпотезою дослідження є твердження про те, що базовою умовою для ухвалення політичних рішень щодо візових обмежень для російських громадян має бути усвідомлення ідеологічного конфлікту між взаємовиключними протилежностями туризму, як позитивної сили миру і розвитку, та терором, апологією якого охоплена значна частина російського суспільства. Відповідно, робиться висновок, що потоки російських громадян, які виїжджають в Європу з туристичною метою, становлять не тільки безпекову загрозу як потенційні провідники ідей «російського миру», а й поширюють моральну відповідальність на приймаючі країни.

¹ Ph.D (History), Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Travel Business and Regional Studies of the V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine. E-mail: parfinenko@karazin.ua; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5951-0230>.

Ключові слова: світова політика, ліберальний порядок, міжнародний туризм, свобода туристичних подорожей, російсько-українська війна.

Problem statement. Travel and tourism have long become a metaphor for freedom and modern lifestyle. The international tourism industry is considered today as an important condition and factor to the globalization of the modern world, embodying the harmony of the free movement of goods, capital, ideas and people.

The global security architecture formed after the end of the Cold War created a favorable geopolitical context for the development of international interaction, trade, travel and other forms of spatial mobility. Currently, there is every reason to assert the formation of a mobility regime, which has become a structural characteristic of the liberal world order (LIO), along with liberalism, democracy, human rights, open markets, etc. The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have put considerable pressure on the liberal world order. This fully applies to freedom of movement as its important structural component. However, if the pandemic put on the agenda the issue of protecting the mobility and rights of tourists, then the Russian aggression formed a collective demand to limit the freedom of tourist travel as a restrictive means of maintaining the world order. Today, this issue is under serious consideration both at the level of individual states and at the level of international organizations. This determines the scientific relevance of the research on the transformation of the discourse of freedom of tourist mobility, which is taking place in the conditions of the war of aggression against Ukraine.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The study of the political potential of tourism, including within the framework of international political science, is presented primarily within the paradigm of neoliberalism. In the context of transnational discourse, J. Rosenau regards travel and tourism, as well as other social institutions, groups and processes, as participants in international relations, “sovereignty-free actors”². In the classic works of R. Keohane and J. Nye, tourist flows are considered in the context of “Complex interdependence”³. International trade, free movement of capital, goods and people (tourists, migrants, workforce) are considered as the foundations of a liberal world order in the works of J. Ikenberry⁴, J. Mearsheimer⁵ and F. Fukuyama⁶.

Important theoretical frameworks to understand the relationship between tourism, borders, and mobility policy are the works of D.J. Timothy and A. Gelbman⁷. Global mobility policy and restrictions on the freedom of tourist travel are considered in the studies of R. Bianchi, L. Marcus and Stephenson⁸. Various aspects of global mobility (travel, voluntary migration and refugees) are in the focus of the study of J. Money⁹, which concludes that the limitations of the sovereign equality of states and the disregard of the equality of people’s rights to travel have significantly increased due to the coronavirus pandemic. The impact of Covid-19 on the reduction of democracy and restrictions on freedom of movement has attracted scientists’ considerable attention. At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused new approaches in the liberal policy of tourist mobility, which requires additional research.

² Rosenau, J. N. (2005) “Le touriste et le terroriste ou les deux extrêmes du continuum transnational”, *Études internationales*, 10(2), c. 219–252. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.7202/700940ar> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³ Keohane, R. O. та Nye, J. S. (1987) “Power and Interdependence revisited”, *International Organization*, 41(4), c. 725–753. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027661> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

⁴ Ikenberry, G. J. (2018) “The end of liberal international order?”, *International Affairs*, 94(1), c. 7–23. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

⁵ Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019) “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, *International Security*, 43(4), c. 7–50. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

⁶ Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

⁷ Timothy, D. J. та Gelbman, A. (2022) *Routledge Handbook of Borders and Tourism*. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003038993> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

⁸ Bianchi, R. V., Stephenson, M. L. and Hannam, K. (2020) “The contradictory politics of the right to travel: mobilities, borders & tourism”, *Mobilities*, 15(2), c. 290–306. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2020.1723251> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

⁹ Money, J. (2021) “Globalization, international mobility and the liberal international order”, *International Affairs*, 97(5), c. 1559–1577. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab118> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

The purpose of the article is to determine the transformations in the liberal policy of freedom of tourist mobility that took place during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In accordance with the established goal, the following **tasks** have been formulated: to define the role of international tourism in promoting the value foundations of the liberal world order; to characterize the global geopolitical context that led to the crisis of liberal internationalism and the reduction of tourist mobility; to analyze the debate that arose in the world political community regarding the idea of introducing restrictions on international mobility for Russian citizens as a means of putting pressure on the aggressive policy of the Kremlin regime; to determine the international political potential of tourist trips as an important concept of the deterrence doctrine.

Main research results. Geopolitical transformations in the late 20th century and strengthening of international cooperation accelerated globalization processes and ensured the triumph of democracy and a liberal world order that continued to take advantage of cross-border mobility, facilitating travel to achieve economic and political interests. But mobility was growing not only as a “condition of global modernity”, but also as a “source of insecurity”¹⁰. Global terrorism, illegal migration, global warming, outbreaks of infectious diseases, global financial instability, etc. became the transnational challenges of LIO, which turned tourist travel into one of the key political problems. The spread and frequency of these threats affected not only the dynamics of the volume of international tourist flow, but also the restriction of the regime of international travel in general, fostering trends opposite to globalization.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 became an extraordinary event for the hegemony of the liberal order and American leadership, which determined the trends of world politics for the next decades. The fight against international terrorism will become a leading political trend, a convincing evidence of the escalation of the conflict between globalization and related Western universalization of life and the traditional values of Oriental societies. Attacked by radical Islamists, the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York were the embodiment of Western capitalism and economic inequality. And it was not by chance that the main targets of many subsequent high-profile terrorist attacks were well-known tourist centers and luxury resorts.

The response to the growth of terrorist threats has been a desire to strengthen our security, to make international travel more controlled and human flows identifiable. It is no coincidence that airports and their security regimes will become “the most symbolic places of the fight against global terror”¹¹. On the one hand, we will observe technical “filtering” through the introduction of video surveillance systems, digital face recognition technologies, and other biometric means of movement control, and on the other, politically motivated restriction of “unwanted” or “suspicious” mobility. According to J. Money, this undermines the liberal foundations of the international travel regime. As destination countries “supplement multilateral rules with unilateral rules” that “restrict” travel from different countries according to their own goals and preferences¹².

However, devaluation of the values of liberal internationalism should be considered in the context of the general crisis of the liberal order associated with the growth of authoritarianism, geopolitical rivalry and aggravation of contradictions within the transatlantic partnership. The rise of authoritarian states such as China and Russia, with apparently revisionist aspirations, has been accompanied by demoralization of liberalism in the West. The war in Iraq (2003-2011) discredited the promotion of democracy and liberal values, and the financial crisis of 2008-2009 revealed structural problems in Western economies. As a result, the world order was becoming more and more multilateral, as evidenced by the appearance of the G-20 platform at the level of country leaders. But countries with frankly autocratic regimes, which have demonstrated that it is possible to be a global economic center without observance of liberal-democratic norms, have entered the world leadership club¹³. All this did not add confidence in the justice of the world order and fair distribution of the benefits of the world economic system. After all, the European migration crisis and the related challenge to unity within the

¹⁰ Beauchamps, M. et al. (2017) “Introduction”, In *Security/ Mobility*. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526108364.00006> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² Money, J. (2021) Op. cit.

¹³ Carter, A. (2018) *Ten Years of the G20: The Illiberal Turn of Neoliberalism's Saviour*. Available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationalrelations/2018/12/04/ten-years-of-the-g20-the-illiberal-turn-of-neoliberalisms-saviour/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

EU have contributed to the spread of right-wing populist movements and leaders such as D. Trump in the United States and V. Orbán in Hungary. It is no coincidence that on the eve of the pandemic, the Russian dictator Putin declared that “the liberal idea is outdated”, “it came into conflict with the interests of the vast majority of the population”¹⁴.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the general isolation of the countries of the world accelerated the mentioned processes and threatened the fragmentation of the world. It called into question the ability of liberal democracies to effectively prevent and confront global challenges, contributed to the spread of centrist sympathies, the restriction of human rights, demand for strong leaders, etc. Among the sectors of the world economy, international tourism suffered the greatest losses, as the primary measures to combat the pandemic included restrictions on mobility and closure of borders. As a result, the pandemic reduced the market of tourist arrivals by 74% in 2021. The securitization of hospitality associated with Covid-19 has become an unprecedented challenge to the international travel and tourism regime, which will call into question liberal notions of the right to mobility and freedom of movement.

General geopolitical context inspired the Kremlin’s criminal regime to full-scale and unprovoked aggression against the sovereign state of Ukraine, which became an unprecedented challenge to European and global security since the Second World War¹⁵. The war waged by Moscow against Ukraine has had a significant impact on the global recovery of the international tourist arrivals market after the pandemic. This is most noticeable in Eastern European countries, which are experiencing a decline in confidence in travel safety. But not only, as the sanctions and restrictions introduced by various governments in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are causing logistical disruptions across Europe¹⁶. In addition, inflation in Europe leads to the decline in income and pressure on consumer spending and tourism demand.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine strengthened transatlantic ties and united the world’s democracies in confronting the aggressor that challenged not only Ukrainian independence, but also the liberal democratic institutions and values that define the liberal international order. From February 2022, international opposition to Russia includes large-scale and increasingly harsh sanctions against Russian assets, international trade, sectors of the economy that serve the needs of the war, as well as individuals and organizations. Note that sanctions are one of the most powerful tools of influence, which was created by liberal internationalism during the First World War. The EU considers sanctions as one of the means of achieving the goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which include the defence of democracy and the peacekeeping¹⁷. In fact, sanctions are a means to coerce those who threaten peace and security.

Back in April 2022, the UNWTO Extraordinary General Assembly unequivocally condemned Russia’s aggression and suspended its membership in the organization. Zurab Pololikashvili, Secretary-General of the UNWTO, noted that Moscow’s actions are contrary to the “very principles of UNWTO and of international governance”, since “tourism is a pillar of peace and international friendship, and Members of UNWTO must uphold these values or face consequences, with no exceptions”¹⁸. This decision, which was ineffective in the first approximation, started a broad discussion¹⁹ about the appropriateness of Russian citizens using the rights and freedoms of a liberal society, the values of which

¹⁴ Barber, L., Foy, H. та Barker, A. (2019) *Vladimir Putin says liberalism has “become obsolete”*. Available from: <https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

¹⁵ Parfinenko, A. (2023) “Russian Revisionism as a Challenge to the International Order”, *Actual Problems of International Relations*, 154(1), c. 18–33. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2023.1.154.18-33> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

¹⁶ Crisis24 (2023) *Europe: Conflict-related sanctions and restrictions continue to cause disruptions throughout the region through February*. Available from: <https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/02/europe-conflict-related-sanctions-and-restrictions-continue-to-cause-disruptions-throughout-the-region-through-february-update-106> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

¹⁷ *European Union sanctions* (2021) Available from: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-sanctions_en?page_lang=en (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

¹⁸ *World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) Members Vote to Suspend Russia* (2022) Available from: <https://www.unwto.org/news/unwto-members-vote-to-suspend-russia> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

¹⁹ Stern, D. L., Timsit, A. та Khurshudyan, I. (2022) “Calls grow to ban E.U. visas for Russians, but not all Ukrainians agree”, *Washington Post*, 19 August. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/18/ukraine-russia-visa-ban-zelensky-arestovych/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

are opposed by the Kremlin regime. It was, in particular, about the main achievements of the international travel and tourism regime. The Schengen visa for Russian citizens traveling to the EU countries caused particular dissatisfaction, where millions of Russians were often perceived as ambassadors of “Russian world”.

If at the beginning of the invasion, world leaders tried to distinguish the actions of the Kremlin from the position of ordinary Russians, calling it “Putin’s war”²⁰, then with the rise of undeniable Russian war crimes and overwhelming support for the so-called “special operation” by ordinary citizens, positions regarding collective responsibility changed.

On August 8, 2022, the Ukrainian President voiced the collective aspirations of the democratically minded part of world society, calling on the West to ban visas for all Russian passport holders, with the exception of people whose security is at risk or who are vulnerable to political persecution. V. Zelensky emphasized that “the most important sanctions are to close the borders”. Russians are “taking away other people’s territory”, so “let them live in their own world until they change their philosophy”²¹. V. Zelenskyi stated in his next speech that visa restrictions for Russian citizens are “fair” and “all defenders of European values should insist on them”²².

In this case, V. Zelenskyi voiced the pan-European trend. The summer vacation of Russians in Europe took place in parallel with the commission of war crimes in Ukraine and caused justifiable indignation²³. After all, relatives of murderers and facilitators of terror continued to enjoy the benefits of Schengen. The political leaders of the Baltic countries and Finland were the first to feel and voice these sentiments. After Europe closed its skies for Russian passenger aviation, the airports of these countries became “transfer points” for Russian tourists who entered other EU countries with tourist visas.

Among the first proposals to suspend visa issuance for Russian citizens under the usual conditions (with the exception of humanitarian cases) was voiced by Urmas Reinsalu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia. He noted that “masses of Russian citizens are now crossing the western border of Russia – through Finland, Latvia, Lithuania – to visit the Louvre in the summer, while children are being murdered in Ukraine”²⁴. Edgars Rinkevics, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, told the Politico website that EU countries should limit the visa issuance for Russians, except for humanitarian reasons²⁵. These sentiments were echoed by other politicians: “It is wrong”, said Sanna Marin, the Prime Minister of Finland, “that while Russia is waging an aggressive, brutal war of aggression in Europe, Russians can live a normal life, travel in Europe, be tourists. It is not right”²⁶.

However, on the eve of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the European Union, which was to be held on August 30 in Prague, France and Germany issued a joint statement, which said that such a move is counterproductive, as it will alienate the entire Russian population, including those who are still loyal to the West²⁷. This idea was not supported by the representatives of other countries

²⁰ Scholz: “This war is Putin’s war”. (2022) Available from: <https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/scholz-this-war-is-putins-war> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

²¹ Khurshudyan, I. (2022) “An interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky”, *Washington Post*, 22 August. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/16/zelensky-interview-transcript/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

²² Zelenskyi V. (2022) *Visa restrictions for Russian citizens fair, all defenders of European values should insist on them – address of President of Ukraine*. Available from: <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vizovi-obmezheniya-dlya-gromadyan-rf-spravedlivi-i-vsi-zahis-77037> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

²³ Harlan, C. (2022) “Russians fleeing to Georgia face resentment, graffiti, loyalty tests at bars”, *Washington Post*, 22 November. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/02/russians-in-georgia/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

²⁴ “Estonia seeks to ban the issuance of Schengen visas to residents of Russia at the EU level” (2022), *Front News Ukraine*, 26 July. Available from: <https://frontnews.eu/en/news/details/36959> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

²⁵ Gigs, C. (2022) “Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania to restrict entry of Russians”, *Politico*, 7 September. Available from: <https://www.politico.eu/article/baltics-estonia-latvia-lithuania-restrict-entry-russia-schengen-visa/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

²⁶ *Finnish PM: EU should restrict Russian tourism* (2022) Available from: <https://yle.fi/a/3-12568274> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

²⁷ Pitchers, C. та Liboreiro, J. (2022) *Germany and France oppose growing calls for EU visa ban for Russians*. Available from: <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/08/30/germany-and-france-join-forces-against-growing-calls-for-eu-visa-ban-for-russians> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

(Hungary, Portugal), as well as Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The government of Portugal stated that EU sanctions against the Kremlin should “punish the Russian military machine, not the Russian people”. This point of view was supported by Spain²⁸. The US State Department took a similar position, whose spokesman said that Washington insists that: “it is important to draw a line between the actions of the Russian government and its policy in Ukraine and the people of Russia”. The US would not want to “close the paths to asylum and safety for Russian dissidents or others who are vulnerable to human rights violations”²⁹.

Despite the different moods within the democratic coalition of the West, the question of the collective responsibility of the Russians was becoming increasingly acute. The new phase of the war was marked not only by the successful counteroffensive of the armed forces of Ukraine, but also by the publication of the facts of new Russian war crimes, nuclear threats by the Kremlin, fake referendums in the partially occupied territories of four regions of Ukraine, as well as the announcement of “partial” mobilization in the Russian Federation. The latter threatened new streams of “good” Russians who supported the war from TV screens to the EU countries. Therefore, on September 9, the Council of the European Union adopted an alternative decision to suspend the agreement on the preferential visa regime with Moscow³⁰, which has been in effect since 2007. Thus, travel to the EU has become more difficult and expensive for Russian tourists. According to this decision, the visa fee has increased from 35 to 80 euros, the number of required documents has increased, visa processing time has increased, and restrictive rules for issuing multiple-entry visas have been introduced. Priority was given to humanitarian visas. In general, the EU’s mobility regime with Russia has become more rigid.

The Baltic countries and Poland, which on September 19, 2022 completely refused access to their territory to Russian tourists, including transit through the country. They were joined by Finland, which also closed its land borders with Russia for tourists. Since June 25, the Czech Republic has introduced a complete ban on the entry of tourists from the Russian Federation, whose Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that we cannot ignore the bombing of the civilian population in Ukraine. The issuing of tourist visas was also suspended in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Switzerland. The visa regime with Russia was introduced by Albania and Macedonia. After all, Germany introduced strict restrictions on obtaining visas for Russian citizens. To obtain a visa to the country, one needs to provide a bank account in the EU and insurance from a European insurance company. Following reports of thousands of Russians fleeing to Georgia, Kazakhstan and other neighboring countries, German embassies in the region reported a surge in visa requests. However, according to the latest instructions from Brussels, member states should not accept visa applications from Russians in third countries, which further narrowed the window of opportunity to enter the EU³¹. Slovenia and Malta put forward demands similar to those of Germany. Even Montenegro, where Russia has traditionally maintained significant geopolitical influence, has introduced restrictions on the stay in the country. Many countries require the payment of visa fees through Western banks and the insurance policy of a foreign company.

Certainly, it can be argued that European visa barriers indicate the transfer of Russian citizens to the category of unwanted guests who are denied European hospitality. In 2022, the traditionally beloved France, Italy and Spain were not among the leading destinations of Russian tourism. Currently, Russia simply does not have a direct air connection with the EU, and new transport logistics have significantly increased ticket prices. If previously a ticket to Europe cost 300-400 €, now it costs more

²⁸ Pitchers, C. та Liboreiro, J. (2022) Op. cit.

²⁹ Hansler, J. (2022) *US says it does not support blanket visa ban for Russians*. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-08-22-22/h_9e364cc1f4de412554f7d9db1767dc13 (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³⁰ Council of the European Union (2022) *COUNCIL DECISION on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation*. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_12039_2022_INIT (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³¹ Foltynova, K. (2022) “Closing Doors: How Europe Is Restricting Russians From Traveling”, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 13 October. Available from: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-european-union-visas-travel-ukraine-invasion/32080584.html> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

than 1000 €. Flight time has increased from 3 hours to 8-24 hours³². But despite the sanctions, Russia has extensive global business connections, and wealthy Russian tourists are eagerly welcomed to fashionable European resorts. A vivid example in this sense is the stunning story of the Russian elite vacationing at the ski resort of Courchevel in the French Alps, where journalists met the Russian singer Valery Meladze in the company of the wife of the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense. It should be noted that the artist refused to answer journalists about whether he was having a good rest while his state strikes Ukraine³³. Oleg Gazmanov, an ardent admirer of Putin's regime, performed at the event as well.

All-European sanctions make it difficult for Russians to visit the countries of the bloc, so Russian tourists prefer non-European trips. Russian tourists are even more welcome in such autocratic countries as Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, etc.³⁴. Before Covid-19, Russia was traditionally one of the key inbound tourism markets for Turkey. In 2019, it was visited by 5.2 million Russians, which accounted for 10% of the inbound tourist flow to the country. Since the beginning of the war, Turkey has become an attractive place for Russian investments and a haven for oligarchs trying to avoid potential asset confiscations. In 2022 alone, more than 1,300 Russian firms were opened in Turkey (compared to last year, the growth was 670%), Russians accounted for a quarter of all foreign real estate buyers (16,300 real estate objects). In January-February 2023, 215 companies with Russian capital were registered in Turkey³⁵.

Despite the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult for Russians to travel freely in Europe and live abroad, the vast majority of the European Union member states have not closed their borders to Russian travelers and continue to issue visas, including for tourist purposes. In 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russians could enter the EU and thus continue to enjoy freedom of movement in Europe. Only from February to September 2022, Russians made 1.3 million trips to the EU³⁶, as of the first quarter of 2023 there is an increase in requests for EU visas by 30-40% compared to April 2022.

All this brings us back to the discussion about the feasibility of preserving the freedom of tourist travel for Russian citizens in democratic countries, which is supported against the background of the terrible terror against the civilian population, which Russia resorts to. The arguments of supporters of restrictive measures are supported not only by Eastern European countries. They are most systematically presented in the analytical publication of The Heritage Foundation, one of the most influential conservative research organizations in the United States. The lead author of the publication, S. Hankinson, is a senior researcher at the Center for Border Security and Immigration. Along with his colleagues, he rightly insists that the effectiveness of economic sanctions can be achieved through increased visa restrictions, which are a valuable non-military means of intensifying the consequences of war for Russia, with the ultimate goal of creating domestic pressure on Putin. The publication emphasizes that these measures do not limit the humanitarian component, since under the US Immigration and Nationality Act, dissidents do not need a US visa to apply for refugee protection. The authors of the article note that the refusal to issue visas to Russians should be part of "a much broader diplomatic strategy to force the Russian elite to live with the consequences of the aggressive war they supported".

³² Dolkens, D. (2023) *90% Fewer Russian Tourists Visited Europe in 2022, Authorities Reveal - SchengenVisa-Info.com*. Available from: <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/90-fewer-russian-tourists-visited-europe-in-2022-authorities-reveal/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³³ Ukrainska Pravda (2023) *Wife of Russia's Deputy Defence Minister spends time in Courchevel while her husband orders attacks on Ukrainian cities*. Available from: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/04/4/7396324/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³⁴ Rescheto, J. (2022) "Russian tourists prefer non-European trips", *Deutsche Welle*, 9 April. Available from: <https://www.dw.com/en/russian-vacationers-flock-to-non-european-destinations/a-62991234> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³⁵ Chablin, A. (2023) *Diasporyi novoy volnyi emigratsii kak ambassatoryi rossiyskoy tsivilizatsii [Diasporas of a new wave of emigration as ambassadors of Russian civilization]*. Available from: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/riacdigest/diaspory-novoy-volny-emigratsii-kak-ambassatory-rossiyskoy-tsvivilizatsii/#detail> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³⁶ *Over 1.3 Million Russians Have Entered EU Through Its Land Borders Since Feb.24 (2022)* Available from: <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/over-1-3-million-russians-have-entered-eu-through-its-land-borders-since-feb-24/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

And the very refusal to issue visas will not lead to a negative impact on pro-Western Russians, who already know that Putin's regime is responsible for Russia's isolation³⁷.

The opposite point of view is presented in *Foreign Affairs*, an authoritative American magazine. The authors of the article refer to the experience of the "Cold War" era and the containment policy associated with it, which encouraged contacts at the level of citizens of the East and the West. Therefore, European visa restrictions were called a "catastrophic" mistake, which contradicts the interests of the West both in supporting Ukraine and in supporting anti-Putin movements. According to the authors of the publication, "Putin's exiles" although they may not have anti-war attitudes, can become either an asset of Putin or an asset of the West. So if Europe wants to undermine Russia's military efforts, it should abolish visa restrictions so as not to "cut off" ordinary Russians from the "non-Putin world"³⁸.

In the context of this discussion, it is important to emphasize that tourism is not only an economic phenomenon or a form of mobility, but also the practice of spreading value orientations and worldviews of nations and providing political influence on this basis. The transnational concept of international relations establishes the status of actors for tourists and migrants and considers them in the context of influence on both the country of origin and the host country. Note that since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, about 1 million people have left Russia³⁹. Far from all of them are opponents of the war, and Moscow itself considers the flows of a new wave of emigration as a significant factor in the construction of Russian world⁴⁰. Strictly speaking, the EU visa restrictions were adopted citing that "there remains a likely risk that individuals claiming to be traveling for tourist purposes may promote propaganda in support of Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine or engage in other subversive activities to the detriment of the EU"⁴¹. As it was when thousands of Russians took part in pro-Kremlin demonstrations in Germany on May 9.

A public litmus test of the loyalty of Russians abroad to the Kremlin regime can be the experience with the unusual installation of a wrecked Russian tank, installed in the center of Berlin in front of the building of the Russian Embassy in February 2023. Installed as a symbol of the defeat of the Russian army, as a visual evidence of the senselessness and cruelty of the aggressive war unleashed by Moscow, the tank became a spontaneous memorial to which supporters of the Russian world carried flowers and pro-Russian symbols. But the biggest surprise for the event organizers was that the Germans also placed flowers on the wrecked Russian tank, which testifies to the incredible intensity of Russian propaganda⁴².

It is quite obvious that conventional warfare introduces a new context for understanding liberal attitudes regarding the right to mobility and freedom of movement, which were promoted during the years of the Cold War and the ideological confrontation between the Soviet and Western blocs. Tourist and cultural contacts during the Cold War were not only people-to-people contact, but also an exchange of ideas and experiences that contributed to mutual understanding. For Soviet citizens isolated from the democratic world, tourist trips abroad were an important channel of public diplomacy through which the "builders of communism" got acquainted with Western values. The digital age radically differentiates the conditions of existence of Soviet citizens from modern citizens of Russia, who have incomparably more opportunities to exchange information and express their position. Therefore, in the face of direct and unprovoked aggression by one country against another, the liberal ideals of the right to hospitality or the right to freedom of travel must be limited by the guest's obligations of good behavior, including non-violent and peaceful attitudes.

³⁷ Hankinson, S., Coates, V. та Bromund, T. (2022) *The Administration Needs to Increase Visa Sanctions on Russia*. Available from: <https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-administration-needs-increase-visa-sanctions-russia> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

³⁸ Borogan, I. та Soldatov, A. (2022) "Europe's Disastrous Ban on Russians. Putin's Exiles Are Crucial to Winning the War—and to Building a Better Russia", *Foreign Affairs*, (28 September).

³⁹ Etkind, A. (2023) *The people's desertion: why Russians are leaving the country*. Available from: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-demographics-depopulation-rate-abortion/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

⁴⁰ Chablin, A. (2023) Op.cit.

⁴¹ Council of the European Union (2022) Op. cit.

⁴² "Wrecked tank installed outside Russian embassy in Berlin" (2023), *Exberliner*, (24 February). Available from: <https://www.exberliner.com/english-news-berlin/wrecked-tank-protest-russian-embassy-unter-den-linden/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

Moreover, the experience of the Cold War and the policy of containment shows that tourism and related forms of mobility were encouraged by “liberal internationalism”, not only as a tool for promoting democratic values, but also as a severe containment measure for countries that resort to violence and terror. The United States has repeatedly used tourism as a means of political pressure, as a demonstration of disapproval of the political regimes of mainland China and Cuba. Key political events such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 had an immediate impact on Western tourism in Eastern Europe⁴³. The boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games because of the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan actually denied Moscow global respectability and prestige.

Awareness of the ideological conflict between the mutually exclusive opposites of tourism, as a positive force for peace and development, and terror, the apologia of which covers a large part of Russian society, is a basic condition for making political decisions regarding visa restrictions for Russian citizens. Flows of Russian citizens traveling to Europe for tourist purposes pose not only a security threat, but also extend moral responsibility to the host countries. After all, the Russian holiday in Europe is taking place against the background of terror against the civilian population of Ukraine and militant rhetoric against democratic countries. The presence of Russian tourists abroad can only indicate diplomatic loyalty to the Kremlin regime.

Unwritten ethical rules should also apply to visits to Russia itself. Realizing that it is unlikely to do this at the level of imposing bans, the UNWTO, as an organization promoting neoliberal values, sent a clear political signal to the world by issuing a “red card” to Russia. It indicates the removal of Russia from the number of players who play by the rules of the democratic world. Usually, such countries practice a “bunker mentality”, dooming the population to isolation from the civilized world. In this sense, the existence of tourism in the country testifies to the legitimacy of the regime, recognition of the nation’s global cultural influence, and its confidence in security.

Conclusions and prospects for further research. The study suggests that the general crisis of liberal internationalism has had a negative impact on the idea of freedom of travel and tourism as one of the value bases of the liberal international order. Moscow’s war against Ukraine has significantly affected the pace of recovery of the international arrivals market after the pandemic, complicated logistics and increased travel costs. At the same time, the war has raised questions about the appropriateness of Russian citizens enjoying the rights and freedoms of a liberal society whose values the Kremlin regime opposes.

The Schengen visa for Russian citizens to travel to the EU, where millions of Russians were often perceived as ambassadors of the “Russian world”, caused particular discontent. As a result, the EU’s mobility regime with Russia has become quite strict. The Baltic states and Poland have gone further than most, completely banning Russian tourists from entering their territory, including transit through the country, in autumn 2022. In response, Russia began to use the borders with neighbouring countries as a means of hybrid influence (directing asylum seekers from the Middle East through the borders), forcing some EU countries to reduce or completely close border crossing points.

But even despite the threats and challenges to the world order posed by Russia, the restrictive measures proposed by European leaders on the mobility of Russians in the collective West were met with mixed reactions in certain neoliberal circles. Referring to the experience of the Cold War, when contacts between the East and the West were encouraged for mutual understanding between peoples, they tried to present European visa restrictions as a tragic mistake.

However, it is the practice of the Cold War that teaches us that restricting mobility is an effective deterrent to countries that resort to war and violence. After all, mobility is not compatible with the apology of terror, the discourse of which is promoted by Russian society. In this sense, restricting the freedom of travel for Russians, which is a privilege of a democratic society, can be an effective non-military means of putting pressure on the Kremlin regime. This form of deterrence against the aggressor needs to be more widely used as a complement to economic sanctions, as it does not contradict, but rather protects the values of liberal internationalism. It should be fully extended to student, cultural, sports, and scientific mobility. The results obtained also make it possible to assert the significant political potential of tourism. It is manifested not only in the ability to promote liberal freedoms and facili-

⁴³ Pedersen, S. B. & Noack, C. (2019) “Crossing the Iron Curtain: an introduction”, In S. B. Pedersen & C. Noack (ред.) *Tourism and Travel during the Cold War*. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429201127-1> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

tate democratic transformation, but also in the ability to act as a restrictive tool to put pressure on the aggressor.

References

1. Barber, L., Foy, H. та Barker, A. (2019) *Vladimir Putin says liberalism has “become obsolete”*. Available from: <https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
2. Beauchamps, M. et al. (2017) “Introduction”, In *Security/ Mobility*. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526108364.00006> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
3. Bianchi, R. V., Stephenson, M. L. and Hannam, K. (2020) “The contradictory politics of the right to travel: mobilities, borders & tourism”, *Mobilities*, 15(2), с. 290–306. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2020.1723251> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
4. Borogan, I. та Soldatov, A. (2022) “Europe’s disastrous ban on russians putin’s exiles are crucial to winning the war – and to building a better Russia”, *Foreign Affairs*, (28 September).
5. Carter, A. (2018) *Ten Years of the G20: The Illiberal Turn of Neoliberalism’s Saviour*. Available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationalrelations/2018/12/04/ten-years-of-the-g20-the-illiberal-turn-of-neoliberalisms-saviour/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
6. Chablin, A. (2023) *Diasporyi novoy volnyi emigratsii kak ambassatoryi rossiyskoy tsivilizatsii [Diasporas of a new wave of emigration as ambassadors of Russian civilization]*. Available from: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/riacdigest/diaspory-novoy-volny-emigratsii-kak-ambassatory-rossiyskoy-tsvivilizatsii/#detail> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
7. Council of the European Union (2022) *COUNCIL DECISION on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation*. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_12039_2022_INIT (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
8. Crisis24 (2023) *Europe: Conflict-related sanctions and restrictions continue to cause disruptions throughout the region through February*. Available from: <https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/02/europe-conflict-related-sanctions-and-restrictions-continue-to-cause-disruptions-throughout-the-region-through-february-update-106> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
9. Dolkens, D. (2023) *90% Fewer Russian Tourists Visited Europe in 2022, Authorities Reveal - SchengenVisaInfo.com*. Available from: <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/90-fewer-russian-tourists-visited-europe-in-2022-authorities-reveal/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
10. “Estonia seeks to ban the issuance of Schengen visas to residents of Russia at the EU level” (2022), *Front News Ukraine*, 26 July. Available from: <https://frontnews.eu/en/news/details/36959> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
11. Etkind, A. (2023) *The people’s desertion: why Russians are leaving the country*. Available from: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-demographics-depopulation-rate-abortion/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
12. *European Union sanctions* (2021) Available from: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-sanctions_en?page_lang=en (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
13. Foltynova, K. (2022) “Closing Doors: How Europe Is Restricting Russians From Traveling”, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 13 October. Available from: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-european-union-visas-travel-ukraine-invasion/32080584.html> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
14. *Finnish PM: EU should restrict Russian tourism* (2022) Available from: <https://yle.fi/a/3-12568274> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
15. Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
16. Gigs, C. (2022) “Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania to restrict entry of Russians”, *Politico*, 7 September. Available from: <https://www.politico.eu/article/baltics-estonia-latvia-lithuania-restrict-entry-russia-schengen-visa/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
17. Hankinson, S., Coates, V. та Bromund, T. (2022) *The Administration Needs to Increase Visa Sanctions on Russia*. Available from: <https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-administration-needs-increase-visa-sanctions-russia> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
18. Hansler, J. (2022) *US says it does not support blanket visa ban for Russians*. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-08-22-22/h_9e364cc1f4de412554f7d9db1767dc13 (Accessed: 26.05.2023).

19. Harlan, C. (2022) “Russians fleeing to Georgia face resentment, graffiti, loyalty tests at bars”, *Washington Post*, 22 November. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/02/russians-in-georgia/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
20. Ikenberry, G. J. (2018) “The end of liberal international order?”, *International Affairs*, 94(1), c. 7–23. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
21. Keohane, R. O. та Nye, J. S. (1987) “Power and Interdependence revisited”, *International Organization*, 41(4), c. 725–753. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027661> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
22. Khurshudyan, I. (2022) “An interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky”, *Washington Post*, 22 August. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/16/zelensky-interview-transcript/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
23. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019) “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, *International Security*, 43(4), c. 7–50. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
24. Money, J. (2021) “Globalization, international mobility and the liberal international order”, *International Affairs*, 97(5), c. 1559–1577. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab118> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
25. *Over 1.3 Million Russians Have Entered EU Through Its Land Borders Since Feb.24* (2022) Available from: <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/over-1-3-million-russians-have-entered-eu-through-its-land-borders-since-feb-24/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
26. Parfinenko, A. (2023) “Russian Revisionism as a Challenge to the International Order”, *Actual Problems of International Relations*, 154(1), c. 18–33. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2023.1.154.18-33> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
27. Pedersen, S. B. & Noack, C. (2019) “Crossing the Iron Curtain: an introduction”, In S. B. Pedersen & C. Noack (Eds) *Tourism and Travel during the Cold War*. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429201127-1> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
28. Pitchers, C. та Liboreiro, J. (2022) *Germany and France oppose growing calls for EU visa ban for Russians*. Available from: <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/08/30/germany-and-france-join-forces-against-growing-calls-for-eu-visa-ban-for-russians> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
29. Rescheto, J. (2022) “Russian tourists prefer non-European trips”, *Deutsche Welle*, 9 April. Available from: <https://www.dw.com/en/russian-vacationers-flock-to-non-european-destinations/a-62991234> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
30. Rosenau, J. N. (2005) “Le touriste et le terroriste ou les deux extrêmes du continuum transnational”, *Études internationales*, 10(2), c. 219–252. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.7202/700940ar> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
31. Scholz: “This war is Putin’s war”. (2022) Available from: <https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/scholz-this-war-is-putins-war> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
32. Stern, D. L., Timsit, A. та Khurshudyan, I. (2022) “Calls grow to ban E.U. visas for Russians, but not all Ukrainians agree”, *Washington Post*, 19 August. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/18/ukraine-russia-visa-ban-zelensky-arestovych/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
33. Timothy, D. J. та Gelbman, A. (2022) *Routledge Handbook of Borders and Tourism*. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003038993> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
34. *Ukrainska Pravda* (2023) *Wife of Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister spends time in Courchevel while her husband orders attacks on Ukrainian cities*. Available from: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/04/4/7396324/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
35. *World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) Members Vote to Suspend Russia* (2022) Available from: <https://www.unwto.org/news/unwto-members-vote-to-suspend-russia> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
36. “Wrecked tank installed outside Russian embassy in Berlin” (2023), *Exberliner*, (24 February). Available from: <https://www.exberliner.com/english-news-berlin/wrecked-tank-protest-russian-embassy-unter-den-linden/> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).
37. Zelensky, V. (2022) *Visa restrictions for Russian citizens fair, all defenders of European values should insist on them – address of President of Ukraine*. Available from: <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vizovi-obmezheniya-dlya-gromadyan-rf-spravedlyvi-i-vsi-zahis-77037> (Accessed: 26.05.2023).