U.S. Stance in the 1967 Six-Day War (Based on Analytical Materials and Diplomatic Documents)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2023.48.117-125Keywords:
USA, Lyndon Johnson, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the USSR, Egypt, Israel, the Six-Day War of 1967, the Middle EastAbstract
In the article, the authors, using original documentary sources, analyzed the features of the US position in the context of the growing international crisis and during the short-lived war of 1967 in the Middle East, taking into account the role of regional players – Egypt and Israel, as well as the evolution of the position of Soviet diplomacy. It was established that the position of the USA regarding the crisis situations in the Middle East, usually ended with wars between Arab countries and Israel, was never unambiguous and very favorable to Israel. In Washington, it was always based on pragmatic political considerations of the need to contain Tel Aviv and, of course, the global confrontation with Moscow, which provided military and political assistance in the geostrategic confrontation in this region to its Arab allies. In particular, it is emphasized that according to the evidence of diplomatic documents of that time, neither the USA nor the USSR actually wanted the escalation of the conflict in this sensitive region for both states and therefore were inclined to a tactical compromise, which became a political reality after the Israeli victory over the Arab neighbors. It is concluded that both during the war and after its end, the Johnson administration did not develop a well-thought-out strategic line of its Middle Eastern policy. Consequently, US influence in the region remained very limited, and the motives of official Washington were simply not trusted in many cases, primarily in Arab countries. Henry Kissingerʼs well-known “shuttle diplomacy” testified to this development, especially after the October 1973 war. The Six-Day War is considered a turning point in the modern history of the Middle East, because its consequences have not been fully eliminated until now. The defeat of the Arab countries for the third time in a row had long-term consequences both for the Arab-Israeli confrontation and for the relations of the great powers among themselves and with regional geopolitical actors.
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